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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND 'r li"fAH, INC., et al., \ 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Th~~d Party 
Plaintiff, a n d Respondent 
and Cross Appellant. 
vs. 
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS, 
LONDON, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Appellant. I 
Case No. 9284 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS 
FACTS 
Respondent shall refer to the parties and pages in 
the record and transcript as designated in Lloyd's brief, 
and to Shennan N. Drain and John A. Drain, doing 
busines~ as D. L. & ,-v·. Transport Company, as the 
Drains, and Roy G. James as the broker. 
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rrhe Drains purchased a truck from Diamond ~, 
Utah, Inc. under a conditional sales contract, which was 
sold to Utah Savings and Trust Company, now Zions 
First National Bank. The recourse provision of the con-
tract provided that upon delinquency in payments, the 
contract would revert to Diamond T. During the course 
of the contract the Drains were delinquent, and Diamond 
'1, was reinstated as the loss payee. 
The Drains purchased a physical damage and a 
partial liability coverage insurance policy from Roy G-. 
James, 'vho placed the insurance through Stephen W. 
Netolicky of Surplus Lines Company, an agent for Canal 
Insurance Company. The Drains paid $209 on the acci-
dent policy (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8), and no payment 'vas 
made on the liability policy. The balance of the policies 
'vere to be financed by the insurance company (T. 78, 
87, 106). 
Canal alleges that in the 1neantime the home office 
of Canal had notified Surplus Lines that unless they 
could 'vrite the full liability coverage, it 'vould be neces-
sary to cancel the existing policy ( T. 15). Canal's agent, 
Stephen \V-. Netolicky, and secretary, Sandra Redding, 
testified that on :\lay 1-±, 1958, notices of cancellation, 
cancelling the policy ten day~ fron1 the date of the 
noticP:s, "Tere mailed to the insured Sher1nan N. Drain, 
the loss payee as sho,vu on the policy Zions First N" ational 
Bank, and the broker Roy G. J an1es. ~Ir. X etolicky fur-
ther testified that the policy 'vas being cancelled for 
nonpa~''lnent, and this 'vas conveyed to the broker a 
nluuber of ti1nes in oral conversations (T. ±6). :Jir. 
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Netolicky testified that he could not remember if he 
told the broker to have the insured send the premiu1n 
in, even though the cancellation notices had been sent 
out (T. 46). 
rrhe insured, upon being orally informed by the 
broker that the policy was not financed, and that it 
\Vas to be cancelled, paid an additional $239 on May 
:28, 1958 (T. 106 - Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9), making a 
total of $4:-!S paid by May 2S, 1958 on the physical dam-
age policy, the liability policy, and some bonds, all 
policies taking effect in April, 1958, and were to run 
for a year, for a total premium of approximately $837 
(T. 81). The broker testified that after the May 28 check 
,,·as sent in, Surplus Lines was no longer billing him 
for premumis due on the policy, indicating that the 
policy was paid-up-to-date ( T. 122). 
The insured, Sherman N. Drain, Mr. Grant B. Bryan 
representing Zions First National Bank, and the broker 
Roy G. James, all testified that they did not receive a 
notice of cancellation of the physical damage policy 
allegedly sent out by Surplus Lines (See Point I). On 
cross-examination counsel attempted to break down Mr. 
James' testimony, but was unsuccessful. The broker did 
~tate that he had had a number of conversations with 
~lr. N etolieky concerning the possible cancellation if 
the premiun1 \\·as not paid, and had received a letter 
stating that it \vould be necessary to cancel the policy 
if the premiun1 \Vas not paid (T. 102, 103, 106). He 
further testified that he did receive a notice of the can-
cellation of the liability policy, and indicated that the 
insured did, too (T. 123). 
3 
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Appellants attempt to make this out as notice of 
cancellation of the physical dan1age policy, but the Court 
should note that if it were the physical damage policy, 
then the loss payee, Zions First National Bank, \vould 
also have received a notice. However, since there is no 
loss payee on the liability policy, ~lr. Bryan would not 
receive a notice, which is the case here. 
Surplus Lines, to the date of the trial, had made 
no attempt to refund the premium paid on the aleged 
cancelled policy, yet on June 30, 1958, a Inonth after the 
May 28 payment was made, when the Drain vehicle was 
involved in an accident, the Canal Insurance Company 
attempted to assert that the policy was cancelled. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY CANAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY WAS NOT CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE 
OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE 
AS TO PREMIUM PAYMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENTS 
AFTER THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED CANCELLATION, 
AND THAT CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY WAS ES'TOP-
PED TO PROVE CANCELLATION. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE 
RESPONDEN'TS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND 
PRE- TRIAL ORDER TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
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ARGUl\fENT 
POINT I. 
THE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY CANAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY WAS NOT CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE 
OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court, in its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law (R. 76), and its amended findings and con-
clusions (R. 86), found the following: 
"14. That the aforesaid Insurance polir~~ 
was in full force and effect at the time of the 
accident, and had not been cancelled prior 
thereto;" 
"14-A. That the testimony of the witness, 
Mrs. Sandra Redding that she mailed the Notices 
of Cancellation to the named insured, and to the 
loss payee named on the ~Canal Insurance policy, 
is true, and that said witness did, in fact, mail 
said Notices, as testified by her.'' 
At first glance there appears to be some inconsis-
tency between the t\\~o statements, and 'Canal so contends 
on page 12 of its brief. The respondents' position is that 
they are consistent, and the Court did not intend to 
modify fact X o. 1-:.1, for the Court only found that the 
testimony of Sandra Redding, that the notices were 
mailed, was true, but did not find that the notices were 
received by the addresses; that the policy was in force 
and effect at the date of the accident because (1) the 
notices were not effective as to form (Point I); and 
(2) that Canal 'yas estopped from claiming they were 
mailed and that the policy \\'"as cancelled (Point II). 
5 
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The insurance policy, in paragraph 13 of the conditions, 
provides: 
" * * * this policy rna y be cancelled by the 
Company by mailing to the insured at the address 
shown in this policy, written notice stating when 
not less than 10 days thereafter such cancella-
tion shall be effective. The mailing of notice as 
aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice. The 
time of the surrender or the effective date and 
hour of cancellation stated in the notice shall 
become the end of the policy period. Delivery 
of such written notice, either by the insured or 
by the Company shall be equivalent to mailing." 
(Ex. 1). 
The testimony, as g1ven by the insured, the lien-
holder, and the broker, as found in the transcript and 
set out in detail on pages 20 and 21 of third party ap-
pellant's brief, is to the effect that the notices were 
never received by them. The insured, Sherman N. Drain, 
testified: 
''Q. Did you ever receive a notice of can-
cellation~ 
A. No, sir I did not. 
Q. On any of the policies involved~ 
A. No, sir, I never received any cancella-
tion." ( T. 78, 79). 
"Q. You had no no tire from anyone con-
cerning eancellation J? 
A. No, sir." (Tr. 79). 
l\f r. Grant G. Bryan, repre~enting Zions First N a-
t i onal Bank, the lienholder~ ~aid : 
"Q. I sho"'" yon '""hat has been marked Ex-
hibit 2, and I 'Yill ask you if you ever received 
6 
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a cancellation notice, which that would be a copy 
of, cancelling the policy which has been marked 
Exhibit 1, which you have~ 
A. No, sir, I do not recall receiving any .. 
thing like that. 
Q. Did you receive any kind of a cancella .. 
tion notice on that policy~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you receive any notice by telephone 
or otherwise, to the effect that the policy had 
been cane Piled 0? 
A. No, sir." (T. 93). 
The broker, Roy G. James, who sold the policy to 
the Drains, stated: 
Q. I show you what has been marked Ex-
hibit 2 \vhich purports to be a notice of cancella-
tion of insurance policy, and I will ask you if you 
ever received a notice that would be a copy of. 
A. I don't recall receiving this type of 
notice of cancellation in connection with this 
policy. 
Q. Did you say you did not receive that 
type notice~ 
A. Yes, I can say I did not receive this 
type notice." ( T. 102) 
As to the question of 1nailing and receiving notices, 
the Court, in the case of Paz. v. lmplen1ent Dealers 
Jfutual Ins. Co., 89 S. 2d 514, held: 
"'Of course, the presumption is that a letter 
properly addressed and deposited in the United 
States post office is received by the addre;;;see, 
but that presumption is rebuttable." 
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.The only notice that was ever received was notice 
that the liability insurance, which was a separate policy, 
was going to be cancelled (T. 123). The question of law 
before this Court is whether the notices, as sent out 
but never received, were effective to cancel the insurance 
policy. A very complete and comprehensive annota-
tion, which covers most phases of this subject, is found 
in 64 ALR 2d 982. Under a cancellation provision iden-
tical with the cancellation provision in the ·Canal policy, 
which is referred to as standard cancellation clause, the 
annotation on page 1000 provides : 
"Where the socalled 'standard cancellation 
clause' has been involved, a decided conflict in 
the decision exists regarding the question whether 
actual receipt of the cancellation notice mailed by 
the insurer constitutes a prerequisite to the can-
cellation of the insurance. A majority of the 
decisions have held that the actual receipt of the 
cancellation notice by the insured is not a condi-
tion precedent to the cancellation of the insurance 
by the insurer, providing the oancellation notice 
itself contains a fixed date on which the can-
cellation is to becorne effective, * * * " (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The Ininority rule holds that the receiving of the 
notices i8 a condition precedent to the cancellation of a 
policy. 6-:l- .A.LR ~d 978, 1012. The n1ajority rule is not 
without Inodifieation for it is recognized by all courts 
discus~ing this question that the notice of cancellation 
rnust agree in every particular \Yith the cancellation 
provision of the policy, and any ambiguity \Yill be strictly 
construed in favor of the insured. 64 ALR :2d. 990. 
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Canal, on pages 23 to 25 of its brief, provides the 
following on this subject : 
•' * * * It i~ equally well settled that a can-
cellation notice, to be effective, must be clear, 
unconditional and unequovical, and that any am-
biguities in it will be resolved in favor of the 
insured, and against the insurer. In 6 Couch 
Cyclopedia of Insurance La\v, Sec. 1442, page 
5098, it is said: 
'l)rovisions for cancellation in an insur-
ance poliey must be strictly followed to effect 
that result. * * * The principle that under-
lies the decisions is that a party is precluded 
from destroying the existing contract rights 
except upon a strict observance of the reser-
vations contained in the contract itself, or 
some statute, or by agreement with, or waiver 
of his rights by, the other party. But in the 
absence of waiver or estoppel it is generally 
agreed that a notice of cancellati1on to the 
insured must be clear, unconditional and 
unequivocal, and that a mere expression of 
a purpose or intention to cancel in the future 
is not sufficient; that is, it must be one of 
actual cancellation, not of future conditional 
cancellation, or of doubtful meaning as to 
time or pnrpose.' Emphasis by Canal) 
"The same author says at page 5100: 
'Furthermore, notice to cancel, must be an 
actual one \vithin the terms and meaning of the 
policy, it not being sufficient to state merely an 
intent to cancel upon compliance or noncom-
pliance, as the case may be, with some condi-
tion; it must so unequivocally inform insured as 
to leave no doubt on his part that his policy will 
expire at the end of the period limited within 
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the terms of the policy, and that insurer's liability 
under the contract will then cease.' (Emphasis 
by Canal) 
"See also § 1406, p. 5021. 
"In 29 Am. Jur., 733, Insurance, Sec. 383, it is said: 
"See also § 379, pp. 730-731. 
''In Volume 6, Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, Sec. 4185, it is said: 
& 
'Such notice must be expressed in positi~;e, 
clear and unequivocal terms. A notice must be 
in accordance with the policy provisions, and 
must be explicit, premptory, and ttncondi,ti'onal, 
so that the insured will not be left in doubt as to 
the expiration date of the policy.' (Emphasis 
by Canal) 
"And in Lindy v. Lilitz Mutual Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 1, 
100 SE2d 544, the court said: 
'While notice of cancellation need not be in 
any particular form, it must be of sueh character 
as to positively and 1l nequit:ocally indicate to the 
insured that the Company does not intend longer 
to be bound by the contract. * * * Any antbig-
uity in the notice 1nust be resolved in favor of the 
Assured.' (Emphasis by ·Canal) 
"See also Chanl!Jcrs v. lr'ashington vlat. Ins. 
Co., (Ga. App.), 17 SE2d 899, and Medford v. 
Pac1"fic National Fire Ins. Co., (Ore.), 219 P. (2d) 
142." 
In defendant's Exhibit :2~ ·w·hich is the notice of can-
ePilation, it sets forth that the policy '\Tas mailed on 
1\fa~r 1-t-, 1958, but does not provide a definite cancella-
10 
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tion date, thus failing to comply with the italicized por-
tion of the majority rule as set forth on Page 8, and with 
the policy canee llation provision. It does state : 
4
' The effective date of cancellation shall be 
five ( 3) days after service of this notice" 
Ineaning that the policy will be cancelled five days after 
the happening of a future event, the future event being 
the service of thi~ notice. The event never took place; 
therefore, the polie:T could have never been legally 
cancelled. 
The insurer chose the method of cancellation and 
set the condition subsequent or future event that would 
start the five days to run. Now he should not be allowed 
to complain of his own choice of action of not following 
the policy provision, but should be bound by his choice. 
In the case of Bretoer v. Maryland Casualty Co., 
245 S\\r2d 532, an insurance policy contained a cancella-
tion provision identical 'vith the Canal cancellation 
clause, and the co1npany sent a cancellation notice "rhich 
stated: ''said cancellation to be effective five day after 
receipt of this notice." The court held that it was not 
an effective cancellation unles~ actually delivered to the 
insured, stating: 
"The 'vritten notice did not fix a date cer-
tain for """hich the cancellation 'vas effective, and 
the insurer had a 'vide choice of many times and 
dates for the effective cancellation moment. The 
notice here, instead of fixing a definite time, the 
arrival of which ""ould be the definite cancella-
tion date, selected an uncertain time to become 
11 
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the terms of the policy, and that insurer's liability 
under the contract will then cease.' (Emphasis 
by Canal) 
"See also § 1406, p. 5021. 
''In 29 Am. J ur., 733, Insurance, Sec. 383, it is said: 
"See also § 379, pp. 730-731. 
''In Volume 6, Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, Sec. 4185, it is said: 
'Such notice 1nust be expressed in positive, 
clear and unequivocal terms. A notice must be 
in accordance with the policy provisions, and 
must be explicit, premptory, and 11;nconditional, 
so that the insured will not be left in doubt as to, 
the expiration date of the policy.' (Emphasis 
by Canal) 
"And in Lindy v. Lil·itz Mutual Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 1, 
100 SE2d 544, the court said: 
'While notice of cancellation need not be in 
any particular form, it must be of such character 
as to positively and unequivocally indicate to the 
insured that the Conzpany does not intend longer 
to be boun.d by the contract. * * * Any anzuz~q­
uity 1·n the notice rnust be resolved in favor of the 
Assured.' (Emphasis by ,Canal) 
''See also Chanz.bcrs v. Trashin_r;ton Nat. Ins. 
Co., (Ga. App.), 17 SE~d 899. and 1lledford v. 
Pacific 1\Tational Fire l1zs. Co., (Ore.), 219 P. (2d) 
14-~." 
In defendant's Exhibit 2_. "Thich is the notice of can-
ePilation, it sets forth that the policy \Yas mailed on 
nla~r 14, ln38, but does not provide a definite cancella-
10 
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tion date, thus failing to comply with the italicized por-
tion of the majority rule as set forth on Page 8, and with 
the policy eane0llation provision. It does state: 
''The 0ffective date of cancellation shall be 
five ( 5) days after service of this notice" 
meaning that the policy will be cancelled five days after 
the happening of a future event, the future event being 
the service of this notice. The event never took place; 
therPfore, the policy could have never been legally 
cancelled. 
The insurer chose the method of cancellation and 
set the condition subsequent or future event that would 
start the five days to run. Now he should not be allowed 
to complain of his own choice of action of not following 
the policy provision, but should be bound by his choice. 
In the case of Breu:er v. Maryland Casualty Co., 
2-t-5 s,-r2d 53~~ an insurance policy contained a cancella-
tion provision identical with the Canal cancellation 
clause, and the co1npany sent a cancellation notice "rhich 
stated: ''said cancellation to be effective five day after 
receipt of this notiee." The court held that it was not 
an effective cancellation unless actually delivered to the 
insured, stating : 
"The \Yritten notice did not fix a date cer-
tain for \vhich the cancellation \vas effective, and 
the insurer had a \vide choice of many times and 
dates for the effective cancellation moment. The 
notice here, instead of fixing a definite time, the 
arrival of \vhich would be the definite cancella-
tion date, selected an uncertain time to become 
11 
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fixed by the happening of a future event. That 
event was the 'receipt of this not~ce by you.' 
From and after the occurrence of that event, the 
insurer, by its written notice, would commence 
to compute a period of five days, and at the end 
of those five days, after the happening of the 
event chosen, the policy would be cancelled. * * * 
It cannot be argued that the policy provisions 
will control over the written notice which, it is 
claimed, had an incorrect date for cancellation. 
The date selected by the insurer in the notice is 
not an incorrect date or inconsistent with the 
policy provision, since the policy permits the 
insurer to select its own cancellation date pro-
vided it is not less than five days after mailing. 
It can choose such time thereafter as it desires. 
Hence, we do not have an incorrect date in the 
notice of cancellation, but 've have a date that 
the policy permits the insurer to choose. With 
a policy that so permits, appellee cannot be 
heard to claim that the policy beean1e canceled 
at a date earlier than its own notice fixed. The 
object of such notice is to inform the insured so 
he may obtain new insurance if he desires. To 
give effect to appellee's argument \vould be to 
permit the insurer to inform the insured of one 
cancellation date but cancel his policy at an 
earlier and different date." (E1nphasis by Court) 
The question came before the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in the case of II art.forcl Fire Ins. Co. v. Brothe, 
262 P. 927, \vhere the cancellntion clause provided "upon 
r<'cPi pt of this notice." The Court held: 
~'The sen tenre in the letter relative to the 
tin1e ",.hen the cancellation \Yould be effective 
1nn~t be regarded as defendant's O\vn construc-
tion of the policy. The defendant had the right, 
under the policy, to na1ne any date or time sat-
12 
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isfactory to itself when the the cancellation should 
take effect. It saw proper to inform plaintiff 
that the eancellation of the policy would be ef-
fective upon receipt of that notice. By that it is 
bound." 
In the case of Paz v. lnzplement Dealers Mutual 
Ins. Co. (supra), a state insurance statute provided, in 
essence, that cancellation may be effected by mailing 
of notice not lt>ss than five days prior to the date of 
cancellation. The insurer sent notices to the effect: 
'"from the receipt nf this notice". The Court held that 
the mailing of notices in compliance with the statute 
would cancel the policy, but then stated : 
'~However, the defendant chose to do more 
than the statute required, that is, the effective-
ness of the notice, with respect to cancellation 
of the policy, after being mailed to the plaintiff 
by the defendant, was further predicated on the 
actual receipt thereof by the plaintiff." 
See also lV crner v. Com1nontvealth Casualty Co., 160 A. 
547; Kamille r. Honze Fh·e & Marine Ins. Co. of Cali-
fornz~a, 221 N.Y.S. 38. 
The ho1ne office of Canal Insurance Company real-
ized that the policy 'Yas never cancelled, and that can-
cellation \\?as predieated upon the happening of a future 
event, for in plaintiff's Exhibit 4, which is a letter from 
Canal Insurance Company to its agent Surplus Lines 
Co1npany, they state: 
"\Y. e are returning the material you sent us 
in connection with cancellation of the captioned 
policy and \\""ish to advise this does not constitute 
evidence of cancellation. 
13 
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''Also, we are enclosing another copy of our 
-Underwriting Rules & Regulations which we 
believe you should review thoroughly." 
The home office, by its own admission, never recognized 
that the policy was cancelled. As the record state, the 
home office returned their notice of cancellation to 
Surplus Lines so there would be nothing in their office 
to show that the policy was cancelled (T. 68). At the 
trial no evidence was introduced that further affirma-
tive action was taken toward the cancellation, yet the 
company now is contending that the policy was cancelled, 
a position wholly inconsistent, unjustified and unethical 
for an insurance company to take under the facts of this 
case, and this Court should strike it down. 
The question may arise as to what is the definition 
of ''service of this notice." The Supreme Court of New 
York, in the case of Mass v. P. A. Trucking Co., 134 
N.Y.S. 2d, 393-395, 'vhere a claim 'vas filed for work-
mens' compensation insurance, the defense being that 
cancellation notices had been mailed, held that: 
''The statute directs that 'no contract of in-
surance issued' for "\vorkmens' co1npensation lia-
bilitY 'shall be cancelled' unless notice be served 
on the employer. * * * Service must be personal 
service or service made by registered mail. The 
exact language of the statute prohibits cancella-
tion unless 'notice' is 'served'. This require1nent 
has had a literal construction." 
The case of Conzpania De.Llstral S. ~~!. v. Boston Jletals 
Co., 107 A ~d 3;)7, in quoting fron1 Corbin on Contracts, 
stated: 
''But "\Yhen, by the ter1ns of an already eon-
14 
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sununated contract, it is provided that one party 
shall have the power to produce certain legal 
results by giving notice, it is usually held that 
this means notice received in fact and not merely 
notice mailed * * * . '' 
Gates v. (iates, 144 A. 2d, 782-785: 
·~The word 'service' in its technical sense, 
has a distinct and well understood meaning in 
legal practice, and as applied to writs and other 
instruments, it means to deliver; to deliver in 
such a manner as to charge the person with the 
receipt of it; to deliver with judicial effect; to 
file; to give." 
From this we see the words •'service" and "receipt'' 
seem to be somewhat synonymous. Therefore, the case 
at hand would fall directly within the rule as laid down 
by Brewer v. Maryland Casualty Co.; Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Brothe; and Paz v. Implement Dealers Mutual Ins. 
Co. 
In the case of Baldwin v. Fi.delity Phenvx Fire Ins. 
Co. of 1\r.Y., 260 Fed. 2d, 951-954, ·w·here the policy re-
quired that notice to be given of an accident, and the 
insured mailed it in, the Court held : 
'• X otice is knowledge or information legally 
equivalent to knowledge, brought home to the 
party notified in immediate connection with the 
subject to which the notice relates. It is not, 
therefore, the sending, but the receipt of, a letter 
that will constitute notice." 
The proof of mailing was not sufficient. Canal had 
to actually sho\\T that the notice \vas served on the in-
sure(l. or received by the insured. Thi~ they completely 
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failed to do. In fact, they didn't even attempt to. They 
had to be received by the insured himself, and the receiv-
ing by the agent, secretary, or wife is insufficient. The 
only evidence as given by Mr. N etolicky and Sandra 
Redding 'vas that the notices were mailed. This does 
not comply 'vith the provision chosen by the insured in 
the cancellation notice. 
Canal understood the burden placed upon it in de-
fending its action, for on page 23 of its brief, it states: 
'·It is well settled that cancellation is an 
affirmative defense, and the party asserting it 
has the burden of proof. Trans-Amerioa Ins. Go. 
v. Wilson, 263 Ala. 532, 80 So. 2d 253." 
Also, in the case of Paz v. Implement Dealers Mutual 
Ins. Co., supra, the Louisiana Court held: 
"It is fundamental that the insurer must 
successfully carry the burden of establishing the 
facts which limit or relieve its liability." 
We submit that the appellants have failed to meet 
this burden~ that the cancellation notices were never 
received by the insured, the lienholder, or the broker; 
that the notices "-ere improper as to form to effectuate 
the cancellation of the poliry; that the hon1e office, by 
is o"'"n admission, never recognized the policy as being 
canee lied; that the trial court did not err in finding that 
t hP polic~- 'vas in full force and effect at the time of the 
loss sustained by the insured, and it should be upheld 
1)~" this Court. 
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POINT II. 
• 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE 
AS TO PREMIUM PAYMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENTS 
AFTER THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED CANCELLATION, 
AND THAT CANAL 1NSURANCE COMPANY WAS ES'TOP-
PED To· PROVE CANCELLATION. 
The issue before the Court, as set forth in the pre-
trial order, was '~whether or not the insurance policy 
in question was in force and effect on the date of the 
loss, to-wit: June 30, 1958" (R. 41). The issue was not 
limited to whether the cancellation notices had been 
mailed, whether they had been received, whether Canal 
'vas estopped from asserting cancellation, or whether 
the policy had been cancelled for nonpayment of prem-
ium, but was broad enough to include all of these. This 
is evident from the opening statement of the Court and 
counsel as found on pages 5 and 6 of the transcript: 
THE COURT:*** 
~Ir. Wilkinson, since he has the burden of 
going forward what are your objections to his 
proposed evidence~ In other words, what will 
be the issues~ 
MR. WILI{INSON: We take issue as to the 
mailing of any notice. We claim they were not 
mailed. 
THE ·COURT: They were not mailed' 
~IR. WILKINSON: Yes, :po notices were 
received; that the notice which they purport to 
have mailed, does not meet the requirements of 
the policy, and that Surplus Lines, as agent for 
Canal Insurance Company, accepted money on 
the policy premium - on the policy, after the 
date they claim it was cancelled. 
17 
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• THE COURT: What does that have - do 
you claim they waived notice¥ 
MR. WILKINSON: We claim, by receiving 
this money, they waived their notice, and also 
that this is proof that no notice was actually 
mailed out to the defendant. 
THE COURT: So another issue, you claim 
will be they waived it~ 
MR. WILKINSON: Yes, that is right. 
THE COURT: Or cancelled it, or some-
thing." 
The Court, 1n admitting evidence of payments by 
the Drains, after the notice of cancellation had been 
sent out, did not err for it realized that such evidence 
was material to the broad issue before the Court. The 
testimony and findings were to the effect that the policy 
was to be cancelled for nonpayment of premium (T. 47 -
R. 86). The insureds were expecting to have the prem-
ium financed by the insurance company (T. 79, 87, 106), 
but upon their heing informed orally by the broker that 
it was not financed, and that it "~as going to be can-
celled for nonpayment, they paid the amount due (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit 9). 'Vhen the payment 'Yas retained by 
the company, it reinstated the policy and waived the 
nonpayment cancellation (T. 46). The la",. is not in 
dispute on this subject, and I refer the Court to 29-A 
Am. J ur. Insurance, St1 r. 1081, 'Yhich states: 
"It is "'"ell settled that the insurer's accep-
tance of a premium after the time 'vhen it should 
have been paid, but before a loss has occurred, is 
a "'"aiver of the forfeiture which might have been 
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enforced because such premium was not paid 
when due." (See cases cited) 
The company had a duty to return the prennum 
and inform the insured that cancellation notices had 
been sent out and the policy was being cancelled. In-
stead, they kept the premium, causing the insured to 
rely on the action of the company, of retaining the prem-
ium, to drive the vehicle thinking it was insured, when 
it was not, thus causing the insured to rely on the action 
of the ·Canal to their detriment. 
This complies with the ele1nents of estoppel as set 
forth in 19 Am. Jur., p. 642, and set out in cross appel-
lants' brief on pages 15 and 16, and the case of Migliacco 
v. Dav£s, 232 P. 2d, 195, cited in third party appellants' 
brief, and the theory of estoppel as set forth on page 
19 of their brief, to-wit: 
''To establish an estoppel, plaintiff must 
prove that they had no knowledge of the true 
facts and reasonably relied on Canal's activities 
to their detriment." 
The whole argument of Lloyds on pages 19 to 22 
failed to take into consideration the fact that the broker 
and ~Ir. Xetolicky had a number of conversations con-
cerning the nonpayment of the premium, and this was 
told to the insured by the broker, but the insured had 
no kno\\~ledge of the cancellation notices. Even if the 
Court found that the insured had received a notice of 
cancellation, the holding of estoppel \vould be the same, 
for the agent, ~Ir. K etolicky, denies that he told the 
broker not to have the insured send the premium in 
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(T. 46). The information conveyed to the insured was 
"send the premiu1n in and all will be fine", thus the 
insured, without a knowledge of the true facts, relied 
on the action of Canal to their detriment. 
The general rule of law is that if a policy is legally 
cancelled, that it is not necesary to return the premium 
paid until a reasonable time thereafter, but this rule is 
limited to premiums paid at the time of cancellation. 
It does not go so far as to say that it is not necessary 
to return a premium paid subsequent to the cancella-
tion notice. In effect, the appellants would contend you 
can cancel a policy, but retain future payments. Canal, 
on page 11 of its brief, after citing the case of J en.s.en 
v. Traders & General Ins. Co. 345 P. 2d. 1, states: 
"The Court further held that the mere fact 
that premiums were paid after the effective date 
of cancellation, and that unearned premiums were 
not returned to the insured, was not sufficient to 
viti~ate the cancellation." 
We submit that this is not the correct holding of 
this case for the Court does not say that the premiums 
were paid and retained after the August 10, 1951 can-
cellation date. The Court states, on page 2: 
"All premiums "\\7ere paid from l\iay 1951 
through November 1951." 
The Court, in the previous trial of the sa1ne case, at 
2!1G P. 2d +:1+-~t-:37~ footnote 3, provides: 
''There "Tas sufficient evidence that the full 
amount of the premimu on this policy for the 
year for "'"hich issued (April 19, 1951 to April 
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19, 1952) had been paid to defendant's agent 
Lotz by Moschetti and Vader, the firm that sold 
the car to DiMatteos, and obtained the policy for 
them." 
From this we see that this case merely upholds the 
general rule and does not give us any law as to whether 
the insurance company is entitled to a cancellation if 
they retain futre payments. Again, on page 16 of Canal's 
brief, it states: 
'''V e have been unable to find any similar 
cases where it has even been contended that a 
policy of insurance, once cancelled, can be re-
vived by the simple expedient of sending in a 
premium payment." 
This statement may be true, but apparently from the 
lack of authority cited, they are unable to find any cases 
that take the position that a cancellation notice takes 
effect even if the insurance company retains payments 
sent in after the date of the notice. The authorities on 
this point are very sparse, but for a \vell settled rule, 
\vhen insurance companies are estopped to claim for-
feiture I refer the ·Court to 29-A Am. Jur., Insurance, 
Sec. 1083, which provides : 
"It is a \vell settled rule of la\v that an in-
surer which, with knowledge of facts entitling it 
to treat a policy as no longer in force, receives 
and accepts a premium on the policy, it is 
estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It 
cannot treat the policy as void for the purpose 
of defense to an action to recover for a loss 
thereafter ccurring, and at the same time treat 
it as valid for the purpose of earning and collect-
ing for the premiums." (See cases cited) 
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Also, in the case of Union Assurance Soc. v. Tolivar, 
141 Fed. 2d 405, the Court stated: 
"An insurance company which issues policies 
of insurance and accepts premiums thereon and 
retains such premiums with knowledge of existing 
facts, which if insisted on, would invalidate the 
policies, waives conditions thereof inconsistent 
with the facts so know and is estopped from 
thereafter asserting such conditions in avoid-
ance of liability." (See cases cited) 
These authorities are not directly in point, but they 
are analogous to the situation and show the thinking 
of the courts as to the accepting and retaining premiums 
\vhen the company intends to forfeit or cancel a policy. 
Canal cites the case of Busby v. The North Ameri~oan 
Life Ins. Co., 40 Md. 572, as analogous to the question, 
but it may be distinguished on its facts. It involves a 
life insurance policy that expressly provided that in 
case the premium \\,.as not paid when due by the terms 
of the policy, that the company would not be liable and 
upon default in the payment, the policy by its terms 
became a nullity. The agent exceeded his authority and 
accepted future payments, but the company did not rec-
ognize them for the insured and the insurer \Yere bound 
h~r the terms of th<> policy. 
There vvas no such provision in the policy at hand. 
The broker~ Ro~~ G. ~Tames, and the agent Stephen \V. 
X etolicky, both aeeepted and retained the pre1nium, 
\\,.hich \Yns ",.ithin their authority, thus Canal Insurance 
Co1npany "·a~ bonnd on thP policy. See [!uion Ass1trance 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Soc. v. Tolivar (supra). The Drains had no reason to 
apply for reinstatement, for the premium was accepted 
and retained, and they had no knowledge of any can-
cellation notices being sent. Without the knowledge of 
the true facts, the insured relied on the action of ·Canal 
to their detriment, and this Court should uphold the 
trial Court in finding that 'Canal Insurance Comp~any 
should be estopped from asserting cancellation. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE 
RESPONDENTS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND 
PRE- TRIAL ORDER TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
The appellants make a big "to-do" concerning the 
pleading of estoppel. Respondent would first like to 
point out to the Court the opening remarks of the Court 
and counsel, as set forth on pages 17-18 of this brief. 
The Court and counsel all realized that the question of 
,\·aiver or estoppel would be a major issue in this case. 
Canal cannot claim it had no opportunity to defend, for 
thi:-; 'vas brought home to them at the opening of the trial. 
It should be realized that estoppel in this case is a 
cause of action, and not an affirmative defense, as pro-
Yided in Rule 8 (c) UR·CP. Appellants contend that 
estoppel, to be a cause of aetion, must be specifically 
pleaded, but the Court should be mindful of the fact 
that the rule is not \vithout exceptions. An excellent 
annotation on this subject is found at 120 ALR 8. There 
it is stated that the majority rule on the necessity of 
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pleading estoppel is that the party must specifically 
plead it or waive the benefits of it, the minority rule 
being that estoppel is available under the plea of the 
general issue, and it is not necessary to specifically 
plead it. The annotation continues further and pro-
vides exceptions to the rule, two of them being : 
''A. Where there is no opportunity to plead: 
"One well settled exception to the rule 
requiring the pleading of estoppel or 
waiver is that, if a party had no oppor-
tunity to plead estoppel or waiver, he 
may give it in evidence at the trial nev-
ertheless, with the same conclusive effect 
as if it had been pleaded specially as an 
estoppel. This exception applies in the 
case of estoppel in pais or equitable 
estoppel. * * * 
"A plaintiff has no opportunity to plead 
an estoppel or waiver where such a mat-
ter is not a part of his cause of action, 
but the necessity of submitting evidence 
thereon and relying thereon appears for 
the first time in evidence submitted by 
the defendant, and he was without knowl-
edge that his demand must ultimately 
rest upon such estoppel in pais, * * * 
"Another circmnstance under 'vhich a 
party has no opportunity to plead is 
":here he has no knowledge of the facts 
constituting the matter until they appear 
in the evidence at the trial ; under this 
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"B. Where the matter appears on the face of 
the pleadings : 
Another exception to the rule requiring 
estoppel or waiver to be specially pled 
is where the estoppel appears in the ad-
verse party's pleadings; in such cases it 
need not be specially pled, where it is an 
estoppel in pais, or waiver, or an estoppel 
by deed, or an estoppel by prior judica-
tion. It has been held that a party may 
avail himself of an estoppel in pais, al-
though it was not specially pled as such, 
if the facts constituting it are found in 
the combined pleadings of the party." 
120 ALR 8, 76, 82, 83, 84. (See cases 
cited therein) 
The respondent had no opportunity to plead estop-
pel, because at the time his pleadings were filed, he was 
not aware of the defense of cancellation. Canal, in its 
amended complaint (R. 32) provided only the following 
as to cancellation: 
dDefendant alleges that the policy of in-
surance referred to in plaintiff's amended com-
plaint, was cancelled on or about the 24th day 
of ~[ay, 1958, and the said policy was not in force 
or effect on the 30th day of June, 1958, and that 
by reason thereof, none of the plaintiffs is en-
titled to recover damages against the defendant." 
He does not bother to allege that cancellation notices 
were snent out. At the pre-trial ''Tas the first time any 
mention "·a~ 1nade of the cancellation notices (R. 41) : 
"The position of the defendant is that the 
policy has been cancelled at a time prior to the 
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loss by the mailing of notices of cancellation in 
accordance with the provisions of the policy." 
During the taking of the deposition of Mr. N etolicky, 
which was after the pre-trial, the appellant introduced 
a photofax copy of the cancellation notice (Exhibit 2), 
and at the trial respondent objected to the admission 
of this evidence and testimony ( T. 22). ·Canal could 
not produce the original nor could they produce two 
copies of the notices that they claimed were in their 
files (T. 22, 29). At the ti1ne of the deposition, respond-
endt was taken by surprise, and 'yas completely unaware 
that notices of this type would be introduced in evidence: 
"~Ir. Wilkinson: At the time of the deposition, 
this notice was completely new to us. We had 
no idea they were going to claim any notice 
was sent out, it is a surprise (T. 25). 
"Mr. \Vilkinson: Nothing in the pre-trial order 
you were going to have a notice - going to 
offer any copy of a notice; no indication at 
the pre-trial there would be anything like 
these offered, and at the time of the deposition 
this was offered after the exhibit 2 had been 
talked about -testified about, so it slipped in 
'vith exhibit 2~ 'Yithout any chance being of-
fered to object to it until after this testimony 
on exhibit 2 had come in, and this had been 
placed 'Yith exhibit 2, so they were offered 
together.'' ( T. 25) Note: Exhibit 2, at depo-
sition, is Exhibit 3 at the trial. T. ~9-29-A). 
Even though estoppel 'Yas not specifically raised 
in tltP re~pondent~' plParlings, there 'Yas sufficient basis 
for the trial Court to allow eYidenee pertaining to it 
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to be admitted. Diamond T had no opportunity or 
knowledge to allege estoppel in their pleadings: 
~'Appellant invokes the general rule that, to 
be available, estoppel must be pled. It was not 
pled. But respondents rely upon the exception 
where, not until during the trial, facts establish-
ing the estoppel appear. If, prior to the trial, a 
party has no knowledge of the facts constituting 
an estoppel, he may avail himself of it when they 
do evolve." (Cases cited) Pain v. Strom, 6 P2d, 
849, 850. 
Respondent had no opportunity to plead estoppel 
as a part of their cause of action, but it was necessary 
for them to rely on it and submit evidence concerning 
it after appellants introduced evidence as to the can-
cellation notices : 
''The facts which lead to the application of 
the doctrine of laches and estoppel appeared 
from the proof submitted by the respective par-
ties on the trial. Under such circumstances, it 
has been held by this Court that the rule of laches 
and estoppel may be invoked without pleading 
the same." Cases cited. Hiller est I rr. Dist. v. 
Nampa & Merid1~an Irr. Dist., 66 P 2d, 115, 118. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the case of 
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs, 288 P. 2d 1025, held that 
estoppel could be relied on as a cause of action when it 
'Yas sufficiently raised in the adverse party's pleadings. 
The Court goes into a good discussion as to the exceptions 
to the general rule : 
"'It is urged on behalf of defendant 
that there is no plea of estoppel in plaintiff's 
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reply, and that, as estoppel to be availble 
should be pleaded, the objection of plaintiff 
cannot be sustained here. But it is also the 
law that, where the matter constituting the 
estoppel appears on the face of the plead-
ing, it is not necessary to urge it by way of 
a technical plea; and such is the case here.' 
"That decision was announced in 1923 and 
has been succeeded in law actions, as well as in 
equity suits, by more than thirty years of ad-
herence to its good sense." 
The courts have held that estoppel may be suffi-
ciently raised even though the doctrine of estoppel is 
not mentioned. In the case of National AVd Life Associ-
ation v. Clinton, 55 P. 2d, 781, 787, the Court stated: 
"The applicable rule in this connection, as 
established by this ·Court, is that if the facts con-
stituting the estoppel are sufficiently pled, the 
pleader is entitled to the benefit of the law arising 
therefrom, even though the doctrine of estoppel 
is not expressly mentioned in the pleadings.'' 
(Cases cited) 
After the Court had signed the findings of fact and 
conclusions of la"~, to the effect that the policy \\'"as not 
in force at the time of the accident, and not previously 
cancelled (R. 76), the appellant filed a motion for new 
trial. At the insistence of the appellants. the Court 
amended its findings of fact and conclusions of la,Y, 
and specifically stated: 
''The Court further finds that the defendant 
is estopped fro1n claiming that the notices were 
1naile<l and from claiining that the insurance 
policy \\'"as cancelled." (R. 87) 
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On the motion of the Court, the respondent was al-
lowed to amend its pleadings to conform to the proof 
adn1itted, thus prperly presenting the question before 
the trial Court. 
Although Canal objected to the admission of prem-
ium payments, it did so on a general objection, and not 
a specific exception. At no time did it object on the 
grounds of variance, and specifically bring to the atten-
tion of the trial Court that the material was not germane 
to the issue, and was at variance with the issue as set 
at the pre-trial. 
The early Utah case of Geanakoules v. Union Port-
land Cement, 126 P 329, laid down the rule regarding 
this: 
"Furthennore, the general rule as to the 
mode of making objections to the introduction 
of evidence which does not correspond to the 
allegatins of the pleadings, is to object to it at 
the time it is offered on the grounds of a var-
iance." 
Also, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the case 
of Snzith v. Brook, 47 NW 2d, 389-39-l, provides: 
HWhere a party relies upon a variance be-
tween the pleadings and the proof to defend a 
recovery, that question should be raised at some 
time during the progress of the trial, and unless 
it is so raised and suggested to the trial court, 
it will not be considered on appeal." 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the plead-
ing is even more liberal, and I refer the Court to Rules 
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15 (b) and 54 (d), which I do not quote because I am 
sure the Court is familiar with them, as ample author-
ity· on this subject. The Court should recognize that 
even though the respondents were the plaintiffs below, 
the appellants still had the burden of proving that the 
policies were cancelled, and introduction of evidence 
by them necessitated the respondent bringing in evidence 
to meet their proof. 
Therefore, the rule, as laid down by Justice ·Crock-
ett, in the case of Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 310 P. 
2d, 517, to the effect that the adverse parties should be 
given the benefit of doubt and must not be misled or 
prejudiced by the introduction of new issues, would be 
applieable to the respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the trial Court and find 
that the evidence is sufficient to affirm the judgment 
in favor of the respondents, and against Canal Insur-
ance Company. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Harold N". ''Tilkinson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
10 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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